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PETER SINGER, "ANIMALS AND THE VALUE 
OF LIFE' IN MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH, 
NEW INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS IN MORAL 
~~ (NY: RANDOM HOUSE, INC, 
1980) , 
In this essay, Singer attempts to de­-
termine one thing: the value of life. 
Based on this determination, one can 
conlcude what kinds of beings have 
rights, and the kinds of rights they 
have. Singer poses a preliminary 
question: Is human life more valuable 
than nonhuman life? Singer claims that 
it is common for people to consider 
human beings more valuable than non­-
human beings. But why is this so? 
Is it because humans have capacities 
greater than those of nonhumans? 
It has been shown that chimpanzees, 
and other mammals and birds, are 
self-conscious, meaning that they are 
able to reflect upon themselves as 
existing in time, and plan for the 
future, no matter how little advance in 
the future they are planning. Singer 
notes that these animals have the same 
kind of capacities as human animals, 
and some nonhuman animals even have some 
capabilities which some humans do not 
have. Hence, Singer claims that 
some nonhuman animals are 'persons'. 
This is an interesting and unique concept. 
Generally, one tends to think of humans 
as the only kind of animals who can be 
persons, and oftentimes, people inter­-
change the terms 'human' and 'person'. 
But Singer stresses the importance of this 
distinction and bases his argument for 
animal rights. and particularly in 
defense of vegetarianism. on this claim. 
Both preference utilitaridnism and 
Tooley's argumentative view of rights l 
stress the importance of being a per­-
son (that is, being aware of oneself 
as existing over time). Hence, there 
is no reason to assume that these rights 
belong only to humans. Thus. the 
replaceability principle, the principle
which states that the benefits gained
by one animal cancel out the loss they
inflict on another animal is not 
applicable here." But Singer notes 
that this does not resolve at least 
one problem: the position in which 
mentally deficient hu~an beings find 
them~,-':'les. 
\~1ile Singer's article concerns only 
the issue of killing animals and not the 
issue of suffering. he is aware of this. 
And although ~e includes in his essay 
arguments concerning utilitarianism, 
and though he briefly mentions the 
'dominion theory'3, he gives specific 
attention to arguments concerning
'intrinsic value'. Because of this 
Singer fails adequately to discuss the 
problems inherent within utilitarianism; 
nor. does he resolve the problems within 
Tooley's argument. Without an adequate 
view of the status of human beings who 
are comatose or mentally deficient, there 
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remains a gap in the argument for animal 
rights. For we must be able to know 
what kinds of rights all animals deserve 
in order to give certain other groups 
any status. This problem, not a new 
one, is considered to be indeterminable 
by many theorists, especially writers on 
abortion. 
Despite the limitations of Singer's 
argument, his view is interesting and 
~orthy of consideration. As an essay 
~n an anthology, his position is 
thorough and revelatory especially to 
those whom are not familiar with the 
subject-matter. His distinction 
between 'human' and 'person' is inter­-
esting and controversial. Whether or 
not it is accurate remains to be seen. 
lcf. Tooley, Michael. "A Defense 
of Abortion and Infanticide" in 
The Problem of Abortion, ed. byjoel Feinberg (CA: Wadsworth 
1973). ' 
2Singer, Peter. "Animals and 
the Value of Life"; see p. 249-251. 
3Ibid.; see p. 228-231. This 
is the theory which states that 
God gave human beings dominion over 
other animals, for their own 
purposes. 
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